This paper examines the relationship between fiscal policy and the current account, drawing on a large sample of advanced, emerging and low-income economies and using a variety of statistical methods: panel regressions, an analysis of large fiscal policy and current account changes, and panel vector auto-regressions. On average, a strengthening in the fiscal balance by 1 percentage point of GDP is associated with a current account improvement of 0.3-0.4 percentage point of GDP. This association appears stronger in emerging and low-income economies, or when the exchange rate is flexible; the economies are more open; output is above potential; initial debt levels are above 90 percent of GDP; and using methods robust to endogeneity issues. JEL Classification Numbers: E60, E61, E62, E65, C40, C01
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between fiscal policy and the current account has long attracted interest among academic economists and policymakers alike, from various angles. For example, the possible link between fiscal deficits and current account deficits has spurred many studies analyzing the "twin deficit" hypothesis, particularly for the case of the United States. For countries where current account imbalances are especially large, a relevant question has been to what extent fiscal adjustment can contribute to resolving external imbalances. Going forward, the implications of fiscal stimulus first, and fiscal adjustment later, for current account developments will no doubt continue to generate interest in the context of returning the global economy to strong, sustainable, and balanced growth as the effects of the 2008-09 crisis gradually abate. This paper analyzes the relationship between fiscal policy and the current account. The paper's main contribution is in the breadth of its empirical investigation, in terms of both country coverage and variety of empirical techniques. Our sample includes about a hundred countries over several decades. The estimates distinguish among advanced and emerging/low-income countries; more and less open economies; fixed and floating exchange rate regimes, and countryyears with small and large output gaps.
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To get a preview of the data, the paper begins with a series of panel regressions to generate broad estimates of the association between the current account and fiscal policy, the latter proxied by the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. The regressions also help identify factors affecting this association, such as exchange rate regime, level of financial and trade openness, whether the economy is below or above potential, level of initial public debt, and the revenue-expenditure mix of fiscal policy. This exercise is followed by an analysis of large changes in fiscal policy and the current account, using the well-known saving-investment accounting identity and event study methods, with a view to informing ongoing debates about the possible role of fiscal consolidation in correcting large imbalances in current-account deficit countries. The paper concludes with panel vector auto-regressions (VARs) using both annual and quarterly data in order to address endogeneity issues in our previous anslysis.
The findings vary across techniques, yielding responsiveness estimates around 0.3 in the panel regressions and annual panel VARs, and 0.4-0.5 for the quarterly panel VARs. This association is stronger in emerging and low-income countries, more open economies, with flexible exchange rates, when output above potential or when initial debt levels are above 90 percent of GDP. These results suggest that changes in fiscal policy are indeed associated with changes in the current account, but the relationship is far less than one-for-one. In addition, the analysis of large episodes reveals a smaller responsiveness of the current account (in the range 0.1-0.2) and, for the most part, the emergence or unwinding of large current account imbalances is not closely associated with fiscal policy changes.
The use of a range of techniques is important, given the unavoidable tradeoffs involved with any single methodology, sample of countries, or definition of fiscal policy. For example, studying the saving-investment accounting identity permits the inclusion of a large number of countries, but is subject to endogeneity concerns. The latter is attenuated with the use of cyclically-adjusted primary balances, but these raise other issues relating to the measurement of tax elasticities and potential output. Structural vector autoregressions with quarterly data on government consumption can help avoid both endogeneity and measurement issues, while allowing a large sample of countries, but provide only a partial view of fiscal policy, by ignoring the tax side. By generating results across a spectrum of methods and samples, the paper provides insights that are more robust than those gleaned exclusively from one method.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. Section III presents results from the panel regressions. Section IV documents the relationship between fiscal and external balances for episodes of large changes in these balances. Section V reports the findings of the panel VAR analysis. Section VI concludes.
II. REVIEW OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Theoretical studies
Fiscal policy and the current account are generally described as being bound by the following well-known identities:
CA = X (!) -M (Y,!) + TP
(1)
where CA is the current account, X is exports of goods and services (decreasing in the real exchange rate, !, where a higher ! denotes appreciation), M is imports of goods and services (decreasing in !, but increasing in the national income, Y), and TP is transfer payments (remittances, net interest and profit receipts). S p and I p are private savings and investment, respectively; S g and I g are government savings and investment, so that S g -I g is equivalent to the government saving-investment balance (or fiscal balance, if there are no government transfers to the private sector).
(1) and (2) also broadly describe the two major causal channels from fiscal policy to the current account, relating, respectively, to:
-Intratemporal trade (relative price changes): this channel works through the compositional effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand-i.e. whether a fiscal policy change raises the demand for domestic (or nontradable) goods relative to foreign (or tradable) goods-and the impact thereof on the real exchange rate (the relative price of home to foreign goods) and the trade balance. Thus, increases in government spending (tax or debt-financed) if skewed towards home (or non-tradable goods), appreciates the real exchange rate and worsens the trade balance. The channel is highlighted well by both the Mundell-Fleming (1960) and dependent economy models (a la Salter, 1959 ).
-Intertemporal responses: this channel abstracts from differentiated goods and real exchange rate misalignments, focusing instead on the intertemporal response of private agents to a given fiscal policy action in a one-commodity world. Now, a debt-financed fiscal impetus that seeks to worsen the trade balance, induces forward-looking agents to impute to their permanent incomes the offsetting future tax increases consistent with intertemporal government solvency. Hence, labor supply rises while private consumption falls, both effects seeking to improve the trade balance and pushing the economy towards a Ricardian outcome. The channel is articulated well in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Frenkel and Razin (1996) .
The Mundell-Fleming (MF) model highlights well the workings of the relative price channel for a small open economy, as well as the importance of variables such as trade and financial openness, and monetary/exchange rate regime in determining the current account impact of fiscal policy changes. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an expansionary fiscal shock raises the demand for home goods and money, inducing a nominal and real appreciation (effected via higher interest rates and arbitrage capital inflows) that crowds out net exports. However, if the capital account is relatively closed, a more enduring increase in interest rates results, crowding out investment, raising private savings, and thus softening the impact on the currency and trade balance. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank's monetary accommodation in response to interest-rate-seeking capital inflows would reinforce the output multiplier while mitigating the net exports crowding out effect. However, this result hinges on whether and for how long a real appreciation can be forestalled via unsterilized (or even sterilized) interventions.
In contrast to the relative price approach described above, intertemporal approaches take a longer-run view, and casting the current account as the excess of current domestic production over current domestic consumption of a single homogenous worldwide good (Frenkel and Razin, 1996) . A key assumption in these forward-looking micro-founded models is that agents take into account future events in their current decisions (agents are Ricardian or nearRicardian). An increase in debt-financed government spending, in this framework, works through the "future" to induce a higher saving and work effort response from private agents "today": agents can foresee that the government must raise future taxes in order to offset the current fiscal deficit and ensure intertemporal solvency; these tax increases reduce the present value of future income (human wealth) and thus induce lower private consumption and higher labor supply in the present. The latter also raises the marginal product of capital, crowding in private investment. The current account deteriorates as long as the private saving increase (net of higher investment) does not offset the decline in public savings (Baxter, 1995) .
Risk premia also become important with forward-looking agents concerned about intertemporal solvency. Depending on whether the fiscal policy change under consideration exacerbates or attenuates debt sustainability concerns, a fiscal expansion can be contractionary or a fiscal contraction expansionary (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; . In both eventualities, the fiscal policy-current account association weakens.
New open economy models developed recently incorporate both the intertemporal and intratemporal dimensions as well as other advanced features such as risk premia, imperfect competition, sticky prices and policy reaction functions in an attempt to reconcile empirical puzzles found in the data: private consumption rising, real exchange depreciating (despite the trade balancing worsening) in response to a positive government spending shock. Perotti and Monacelli (2007) argue that private consumption could indeed rise in response to a government spending shock if agents needed to consume more to compensate for the misery of working harder and agents were unwilling to tilt consumption towards the future (small intertemporal elasticity of substitution). The real exchange rate depreciation is explained through international risk-sharing in complete financial markets; 3 while the worsening of the trade balance occurs if consumption of foreign goods is relatively insensitive to the real depreciation (intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is low). offer an 3 The marginal rate of substitution between the home and foreign country private consumption must be mirrored by the real exchange rate. Thus, a rise in current home private consumption (relative to the rest of the world) implies a real depreciation of the home currency.
alternative explanation for currency depreciation, grounded in deep habits: higher demand following the government spending shock induces firms to lower their markups to capture market share, thus, depreciating the domestic currency. Finally, Lane (2010) contends that "news that induces the government to provide fiscal impetus may also lead to a sell-off in currency markets."
Empirical Studies
Previous empirical studies have generally found evidence suggesting that fiscal expansions worsen the current account. Estimates of the impact of 1 percentage point of GDP increase in the government deficit on the current account range between 0.2-0.7 percentage point of GDP, depending on the sample and techniques used (Appendix I). A few studies (mostly for large advanced economies) have also addressed the impact of fiscal policy on the real exchange rate, finding mixed effects.
The methodologies used can be broadly grouped into three categories. The first category studies the impact of fiscal policy on external imbalances using causality tests and VARs. The second category analyzes the long-term correlation between indicators of fiscal policy and external imbalances, using cointegration techniques, and single or panel regressions techniques. The third category invokes the narrative approach to identify exogenous changes in fiscal policy and uses regression analysis to study their impact on external imbalances. The rest of this section presents a few key recent studies for each category, with the remaining studies summarized in Table 1 .
VAR Studies
Studies using VARs have primarily looked at small samples of advanced economies. An important methodological choice in this setup is how to identify exogenous fiscal shocks. The preferred method in recent studies (e.g., Monacelli and Perotti, 2007; Beetsma et al, 2007) is to use changes in the log of real government consumption, because this measure is less affected by changes in GDP than is the case for alternatives such as the overall deficit/GDP ratio or the ratio of real government consumption to GDP. Indeed, this measure will also be used in the panel VAR section of this paper.
On the whole, these studies have generally found evidence consistent with a small negative impact of fiscal expansions on the current account balance, except in large economies (like the United States), where the results are more mixed. For selected EU countries, Beetsma et al (2007) find that a government spending innovation of 1 percentage point of GDP worsens the trade balance by 0.5 percentage point of GDP upon impact and by 0.8 after two years. The real effective exchange rate appreciates (after a year), suggesting that the main short-term transmission channel upon impact is output, with the real exchange rate playing a greater role over longer horizons. For the United States, Monacelli and Perotti (2007) find that, following an increase in real government consumption by 1 percentage point of GDP, the trade balance stays around trend initially, but improves by 0.5 percentage points after about 3 years. They find stronger evidence in support of the twin deficits hypothesis (albeit only on impact) in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Similar results are obtained for the same countries by Corsetti and Muller (2006) , who point out that the impact of fiscal shocks on the current account seems to be greater and longer-lasting in economies where total trade is higher as a share of GDP (Canada and the United Kingdom) than in economies where trade is a smaller share of GDP (US and Australia).
Long-term Correlations and Panel Regressions
Studies involving large panels of countries are relatively rare. They are usually based upon panel regressions and find a statistically significant impact of fiscal variables on external imbalances. Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2009) study determinants of the current account (in percent of GDP) for 135 countries (over 1975-2004) using a battery of random effects GLS regressions, and report a coefficient of 0.3 on the fiscal balance regressor (in percent of GDP) for the full sample. Mohammadi (2004) finds, for a sample of 20 advanced and 43 emerging and developing economies that a tax-financed spending increase is associated with a current account worsening of 0.16-0.29 percent of GDP (0.23-0.32 percent of GDP for developing countries, and 0-0.26 for advanced economies). If the spending is bond-financed, the current account balance worsens by 0.45-0.72 percent of GDP (0.55-0.81 percent of GDP for developing countries, and 0.22-0.50 for advanced economies). His estimated coefficients imply broadly symmetrical impact for fiscal expansions and contractions.
Other important studies include IMF (2008) , which applies panel techniques to both developing and advanced economies and finds that a 1 percentage point of GDP increase in government consumption is associated with an appreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate of 2.5 to 3 percent. The actual impact on the current account could vary depending on the dynamic adjustment path of the actual real exchange rate toward the equilibrium; large current account worsenings can obtain if the real exchange rate appreciates above its equilibrium level (overshooting). Khalid and Guan (1999) use cointegration techniques in selected countries and find that the empirical evidence does not support any long-run relationship between the current account deficit and the fiscal deficit for advanced economies, while the data for developing countries does not reject such a relationship. However, their results suggest a causal relationship between the fiscal and current account balances for most countries in their sample, running from the budget balance toward the current account balance. Romer and Romer (2007) investigate the impact of exogenous changes in the level of taxation on economic activity in the U.S. They use the narrative record, presidential speeches, executivebranch documents, and Congressional reports to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for all major postwar tax policy actions. This narrative analysis allows them to distinguish tax policy changes resulting from exogenous legislative initiative (aimed, for example, at reducing an inherited budget deficit, or promoting long-run growth) from changes driven by prospective economic conditions, countercyclical actions, and government spending. Their estimates indicate that exogenous tax increases are highly contractionary, largely via a powerful negative effect on investment. Insofar as investment spending is an important current account determinant, the results point to a strong association between fiscal contraction and current account improvements. Using Romer-Romer data, Feyrer and Shambaugh (2009) estimate that one dollar of unexpected tax cuts in the U.S. worsens the U.S. current account deficit by 47 cents.
Narrative Approach
A more recent dataset by Devries et al (2011) expands the narrative approach to identify actionbased consolidations in 15 advanced economies. Evidence from that dataset suggests that the current account responds strongly to fiscal consolidation; implied response ratio is about 0.6 (Leigh et al, forthcoming) . As the work is, as yet, unpublished, it is not possible to comment on the robustness of this result, and the extent to which it can be extrapolated to a larger group of countries.
III. PANEL REGRESSIONS OF CURRENT ACCOUNT ON FISCAL BALANCE
We begin our empirical analysis with panel regressions on 88 non-oil exporting economies spanning the period 1970-2007. 4 The distinction between advanced (30 countries) and emerging and low-income countries (58) is as per the IMF Fiscal Monitor (April 2011). The two key variables, the current account-to-GDP ratio and the cyclically-adjusted primary balance-topotential GDP ratio, are derived from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database (see below on derivation). Data quality was checked through reconciliation with IMF staff reports (with regard to the saving investment identity). For most advanced economies, the coverage starts from 1970; however, data on transition economies and many emerging and low-income economies is available for the post-1990 period only. The analysis discriminates country-years across several dimensions: the latter estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The output gaps were combined with a standard 1/0 elasticity assumption for revenues/expenditures to compute the cyclically-adjusted primary balance-to-GDP ratio, the main regressor.
The choice of the cyclically-adjusted primary balance-to-potential GDP ratio (CAPB) as the preferred measure of fiscal policy, as opposed to the headline fiscal balance, reflects the need to address the endogeneity problem that arises because shocks to the regressand (current account), especially due to growth, may be strongly correlated with headline fiscal balances. 5 The resulting estimation bias is generally expected to be negative in advanced economies, with faster growth typically driving higher imports (weaker current accounts) and favorable automatic stabilizers and countercyclical fiscal policy (stronger headline balance). Denominator effects due to GDP scaling further aggravate this bias. In emerging and low-income countries, the direction of the bias is less easy to predict. Indeed in export-led economies, growth shocks would imply a comovement in fiscal and external balances. Alternatively, financing constraints accompanying say, an adverse growth shock, could induce corrections in both fiscal and current account deficits.
The choice of CAPB (which is scaled to potential GDP), while raising measurement issues in relation to tax elasticities and the output gap, helps attenuate the "automatic stabilizer and denominator" components of the bias noted above. Although the third component, which concerns the endogeneity of fiscal policy remains uncorrected, recent studies suggest that counter-cyclical fiscal policy is not the norm in Europe (Beetsma et al, 2009 ) while action-based fiscal consolidations in advanced economies, more generally, are at least as likely to happen in bad times as in good ones (Devries et al, 2011) . This is particularly plausible in cases where weaker growth reveals underlying structural fiscal laxity and/or places binding financing constraints; the recent experience of peripheral European countries and emerging markets and low-income countries from earlier crises tends to support this view. Moreover, insofar as fiscal policy is subject to implementation lags, the share of say, a counter-cyclical fiscal expansion that is observed in the year in which the negative growth shock occurred, would likely be significantly less than 1. Overall, therefore, while we expect some endogeniety bias, we do not, a priori, expect to be large or systematically skewed in one direction.
The regression results, obtained used fixed effects, are summarized in Table 1 . 6 The findings suggest that, on average, a strengthening in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance-to-potential GDP ratio (CAPB) of 1 percentage point is associated with an improvement in the current account-to-GDP ratio of about 0.3. The impact varies intuitively depending on the country-year characteristics noted above.
The coefficient on the CAPB in the overall regression is 0.35. It is significantly larger (0.38) for emerging and low-income economies than for advanced economies (0.24). A possible interpretation is that, in emerging and low-income countries, trade openness is higher while public spending includes a nontrivial share of foreign goods; so that the fiscal expansions are more likely to spill over into imports than is the case of advanced economies. Moreover, as noted in the review of theoretical studies, relative price effects in advanced economies have been documented to be counter-intuitive, with the exchange rate often depreciating in response to fiscal expansions (Monacceli and Perotti, 2006 and .
Comparing across higher trade openness, the coefficient on CAPB is more than twice as large in more open economies than in less open ones. The difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This result is intuitive, as in economies more open to international trade, a greater share of the additional demand stemming from a fiscal expansion would be met through imports.
Empirical regularity is also maintained for the role of exchange rate regimes, with the coefficient obtaining under flexible exchange rates higher by 0.13 percentage points than that yielded under fixed exchange rates. The Mundell-Fleming model predicts stronger fiscal policy output multipliers under fixed exchange rates, as the automatic monetary accommodation prevents (at least in the short term) the net exports crowding effect that would otherwise obtain under a flexible regime via higher interest rates and currency appreciation.
Within the context of flexible exchange rates, we obtain a somewhat puzzling result on financial openness. It would generally be expected that the more financially integrated an economy, the faster the response of capital inflows to a fiscal expansion-induced increase in interest rates, and hence the stronger the resulting currency appreciation and crowding out of net exports. However, we get the opposite result, with more financially open economies registering a significantly weaker coefficient. The strength of the result (a divergence of 0.34 percentage points significant at the 1 percent level) suggests that a superior measurement of financial openness or classification of exchange rate regime would not explain it away. In fact, the puzzle has also been observed in other recent studies of the impact of fiscal expansions on the trade balance (Dellas et al, 2005) and the interest rate (Aisen and Hauner, 2009 ). These studies suggest that monetary accommodation and neo-Keynesian channels may play a stronger role than the traditional Mundell-Fleming framework envisages. For instance, as discussed in Spilimbergo et al (2009) , if monetary policy were targeted at stabilizing interest rates (as opposed to stabilizing inflation or nominal demand), the output multiplier could double and the net export crowding out effect associated with fiscal expansions under flexible exchange rates significantly weakened.
The association between fiscal policy and the current account also appears to be affected by the level of the output gap, albeit weakly. The direction is intuitive: when output is above its potential, a fiscal expansion is more likely to result in additional imports; on the other hand, when output is below potential, the additional demand stemming from a fiscal expansion is more likely to be met by increased production of domestic goods and services, rather than through imports.
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A high level of public indebtedness seems to weaken the fiscal policy-current account association, by 0.09 percentage points, although the significance level is low. The result is broadly in line with theoretical predictions that fiscal expansions at high debt levels, by accentuating debt sustainability concerns, can be contractionary, and result in a weaker association between fiscal and external balances. We explore different debt thresholds but find that the effect kicks in at a fairly high level -90 percent of GDP -consistent with the finding in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) that the contractionary effects of debt are not noticeable at levels below that.
Finally, we look at whether the revenue-expenditure mix of changes in fiscal policy matters for the latter's relationship with the current account. For this, we divide the sample into years in which there were fiscal expansions and years in which there were fiscal contractions, as measured by a change in the CAPB.
8 Then, we compute, for each sub-sample, the median contribution of the change in revenue to the change in CAPB . We find this share to be 0.19 in fiscal expansions and 0.42 in fiscal contractions, suggesting that the revenue effort was twice as much during fiscal consolidations than during fiscal expansions (the median for the whole sample was 0.33). Next, we generate dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the revenue share is in excess of the relevant sub-sample median. The coefficients on the interaction regressors indicate, interestingly, that revenue-led contractions are associated with a sharper current account improvement than is the case for expansions. This appears intuitive, given (i) the high median revenue share in contractions (of 0.42); and (ii) the finding in Romer and Romer (2007) that tax increases exert a large negative impact on activity. If the tax increase and associated costs were seen to be very large, the favorable Ricardian offset from households (that would have otherwise supported imports) may be weakened. Moreover if the anticipated slowdown in output induced firms to reduce private investment, import demand would fall, producing an even stronger contraction in the current account.
Overall, the panel regressions suggest that the current account registers an improvement of about 0.3 percentage point of GDP with every 1 percentage point (of potential GDP) improvement in the CAPB. However, this coefficient is lower for advanced economies, while varying intuitively with trade openness, choice of exchange rate regime, initial public debt and the revenueexpenditure composition of fiscal policy changes. We now turn to episodes of large increases and decreases in the current account and CAPB, to better understand the role fiscal policy can play in the correction of large imbalances.
IV. ANALYSIS OF LARGE CHANGES IN FISCAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCES
In the previous analysis we pooled all fiscal policy changes, large and small, together. In this section we focus on large changes in fiscal policy or large changes in the current account balance to see if they generate a different correlation between the underlying variables. Using subsamples of large episodes can help us better understand the link between external and internal rebalancing, a relevant policy question today in countries facing both large fiscal and current account deficits.
The starting point for this analysis is setting the criteria for identification of large persistent changes in the current account and the CAPB. To this end, for each country, we extract episodes in which its current account or CAPB cumulatively improved (or worsened) by at least 2 percentage points of GDP while registering an average per annum improvement (worsening) of 1.5 percent of GDP.
9 These criteria are consistent with the well-known methodology for advanced economies in Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2009) . For emerging markets and lowincome countries, there are no benchmark criteria in the literature but given the significantly higher volatility of fiscal and external balances in these countries, it would appear that somewhat tighter criteria would be needed if the focus is to remain on truly large episodes. Accordingly, for emerging and low-income economies, we use a criterion of 3 percentage points of GDP for cumulative change and 2 percent of GDP average per annum change.
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The application of the above noted criteria yields four sets of episodes listed in Appendix II. As can be seen, we recover about 40 episodes per set in the case of advanced economies and 100 episodes per set in the case of emerging and low-income economies. Table 2 below presents the corresponding summary saving-investment identity analysis. A number of interesting patterns emerge are discernible: -The episodes in emerging and low-income economies are, on average, shorter than for advanced economies (by about half a year) but larger, by a factor of about 1.5. In advanced economies, the average change for the current account is 6.5 percent of GDP spanning over 2 years, and for the government saving-investment balance is around 6 percent of GDP spanning about 2.5 years. For emerging and low-income economies, the expansions and contractions are larger by a factor of 1.5, while the episodes shorter by about ! a year.
-Large current account deteriorations and improvements are generally not reflected in improvements in the government saving-investment balance (GSIB). This is clearly visible for advanced economies, where the entire action is in the private S-I balance (PSIB), with equal contributions from private saving and investment. For emerging and low-income countries, the GSIB contributes only about one-fourth of the change in the current account. The PSIB contribution in this case is notably led by changes in private saving.
-For large fiscal expansions and contractions, the corresponding (and scaled) current account change (reported in the final two columns) is generally in the 0.1-0.2 range, indicating weaker association than was observed in the panel regressions. The current account change is smaller for advanced economies, especially for fiscal expansions and this appears to be driven by differences in Ricardian offsets. For advanced economies, private savings offset about 40 percent of the fiscal impulse (large CAPB changes), but this share is about one-tenth for emerging economies. This could in part reflect myopia, or the existence to a greater extent of other factors that cause Ricardian equivalence to break down, such as shorter life spans/planning horizons and liquidity constrained households. It could also reflect the higher trade openness of emerging and low-income countries (as noted in section III) as well as the non-traditional behavior of real exchange rates during fiscal expansions in advanced economies, as documented in Monacelli and Perotti (2007) and . Studying the individual episodes, we can, in fact, confirm that the real exchange rate response to fiscal policy changes is nil in advanced economies but supportive in emerging economies.
The reason why the current account changes are somewhat stronger during fiscal contractions may be due to the fact that large corrections are typically concentrated in bad times, i.e. when growth (and demand for imports) is falling, producing stronger co-movement between external and fiscal balances. Indeed, more than two-third of the large consolidations identified in Devries et al (2011) occur against a backdrop of declining growth. We find a similar pattern in our sample: of the 186 large fiscal consolidations, 100 started in the year that growth declined. On the other hand, 93 of the 166 fiscal expansions occurred despite rising growth. That three-fourths of the fiscal consolidations follow an increase in public debt in our sample suggests that debt sustainability concerns often trump the desirability of providing counter-cyclical fiscal impetus.
Table 2 -Summary of S-I Identity Analysis of Large Episodes
(means; figures in percent of GDP, except for CAPB, which is percent of potential GDP)
Advanced Economies
Emerging and Low-Income Countries Notes: CA, GSIB, CAPB are abbreviations for current account, government saving-investment balance and cyclically-adjusted primary balance, respectively; "+" denotes improvement and """denotes worsening; Sg (Sp) denotes government (private) saving, and Ig (Ig) denotes government (private) investment, so that Sg-Ig (Sp-Ip) denotes the government (private) S-I balance.
A complementary "event analysis" generates additional insights into the dynamics of large expansions and adjustments. Appendix III traces the paths of the key constituent variables of the S-I identity as well as fiscal balances for both advanced and emerging/low-income economies, revealing that large episodes are invariably reversals of earlier trends. This appears to be true, both for improvements and deteriorations. The charts also highlight the notably higher year-toyear volatility of emerging and low-income economies, including through the wider standard deviation bands around the mean trajectories.
Equally interesting is Figure 1 , which tracks the behavior of other key macro-fiscal variables before, during and after episodes of large CAPB improvements. To underline the contrast between advanced and developing economies, we show trajectories for both (with broken lines representing the latter group). An important difference between the two groups emerges in relation to the behavior of the real exchange rate, which is notably unsupportive of external adjustment in advanced economies. This pattern is consistent with several recent studies showing fiscal expansions to be associated with real depreciations in advanced economies (Monacelli and Perotti, 2007; . On the other hand, the public debt and growth charts bring out the common pattern of large CAPB improvements occurring on foot of a rapid increase in public indebtedness, rather than in the context of counter-cyclical demand management. Finally, medians current account changes (scaled to CAPB changes) computed over several subsamples suggest some support for patterns identified in the panel regressions, but also raise new questions (Table 2) . For instance, current account changes are larger in economies more open to trade only in the case of large fiscal expansions. Fiscal contractions are characterized by larger private sector offsets in more open economies, resulting in smaller current account improvements. A possible interpretation could be that the relative price adjustments in the case of fiscal contractions may be more difficult to effect than the real appreciations associated with fiscal expansions. Insofar as trade openness exacerbates this asymmetry, we would observe the pattern of current account change noted above.
With regard to exchange rate regime, the results are in line with the panel regressions: the current account changes are noticeably higher under floating exchange rates. However, we now have some more insight into where the puzzling result on financial openness (documented earlier) in the context of floating exchange rates comes from. The counter-intuitive result is driven mainly by fiscal contractions, where higher financial openness is associated with weaker current account improvements. A plausible explanation could be the role of market power in emerging and lowincome country domestic debt markets which could cause interest rates to rise more sharply in response to increased government bond issuance (fiscal expansions) than to fall in response to lower government borrowing (fiscal contractions) (see Abbas and Sobolev, 2009 ). Insofar as financial openness augments this asymmetric interest-rate responsiveness, the size of fiscal expansion-linked currency appreciations would tend to be larger and the size of fiscal contraction-linked currency depreciations smaller.
Table 2 -Current Account Changes During Large Fiscal Policy Changes
(median current account change = # current account ratio / # cyclically-adjusted primary balance ratio)
The results on the revenue share in large fiscal contractions echo those obtained earlier. More revenue-led consolidations appear to drive progressively weaker private sector offsets, strengthening the fiscal policy-current account association.
Finally, Figure 2 documents the possible role of "over-heating" in determining the effectiveness of large fiscal consolidations for correcting external imbalances. The left panel plots the current account changes against the cumulative real exchange rate appreciation in the two years prior to the first year of consolidation. The right panel plots current account changes against the level of the output gap at the start of the episode. The results are intuitive and statistically significant: the current account changes are stronger the greater the degree of "overheating" at the start of the episode. Overall, we find that the median current account changes (scaled to CAPB changes) are notably lower (in the 0.1-0.2 region) than observed in the panel regressions with the whole sample. This indicates a limited role for fiscal policy in the correction of large imbalances. However, there is interesting variation across episodes which can be explained by factors already highlighted in section III: exchange rate regime, financial and trade openness, revenue-expenditure mix, public indebtedness and the degree of overheating. Given the broad patterns from section III on the entire sample, and supporting specific insights from section III on large episodes, we are in a position to turn to more refined econometric analysis, where issues of endogeneity can be better addressed.
V. PANEL VECTOR AUTO-REGRESSIONS
To analyze the dynamic impact of fiscal policy changes on the current account, this section moves to a VAR specification. Understanding the dynamic effects of fiscal policy changes has been the focus of a recent literature starting with the work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Fatás and Mihov (2001) among others. The main difficulty of this literature is to identify the exogenous changes in fiscal policy in order to estimate the impact of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables. One of the most-used methods in the literature is the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) . By using information on cyclical elasticities of taxes and government spending, one can eliminate the automatic reaction of fiscal policy to the cycle and then estimate the impact that the exogenous component of fiscal policy has on output and other macroeconomic variables. Indeed, this approach inspired our invocation of changes in cyclicallyadjusted primary balances as a proxy for exogenous changes in fiscal policy in the previous two sections.
However, as the recent crisis has revealed, the computation of cyclically-adjusted primary balances raises some important methodological concerns. In particular, it is difficult to (i) capture the time-varying and state-dependent nature of tax elasticities (Sancak et al, 2010) ; (ii) filter out the impact of temporary asset-price movements on fiscal balances; and (iii) accurately measure potential output, and hence output gaps, in emerging and low-income countries undergoing rapid convergence or transition.
For this reason, a group of researchers has attempted to address the endogeneity problem by focusing on the component of the budget that is less likely to react to changes in output: government consumption. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) make use of the assumption that government consumption does not react to changes in output within a quarter. In this section, we follow this approach and restrict our analysis to shocks in government consumption even if this just provides a partial view on potential changes in fiscal policy. This approach has been followed by many of the recent empirical papers in the literature, including those looking at effects on the exchange rate and the current account (Corsetti et al, 2010 , Beetsma et al, 2007 or Monacelli and Perotti, 2007 ).
An alternative would be to follow the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (2007) applied to the analysis of the current account in Feyrer and Shambaugh (2009) or Bluedorn and Leigh (2011) . But given our interest in a large sample of countries this is not feasible. In addition, there are concerns about the potential subjectivity in the definition of these events as well as about possible anticipation before the actual date when they are coded . While the anticipation critique also applies to pre-announced changes in government spending, actual spending profiles are more likely to include an element of pure surprise, due to both unanticipated in-year policy changes, as well unexpected changes in seasonality.
Regarding the frequency of the data, we perform two separate exercises. We start with a large sample of countries that uses annual data (see Appendix V for a list of countries and years). Clearly, the assumption that government consumption does not respond to GDP within a year is less justifiable than if we simply assumed that there is no reaction within a quarter. However, we are not the first looking at annual data. Recent papers in the literature such as Corsetti et al (2010) or Beetsma et al (2007) have made use of annual data. The motivation for using annual data is to look at a larger sample of countries over a longer time span. How restrictive is the assumption that government consumption does not react to output within a year? Corsetti et al (2010) discuss this issue in detail and, while it might be that during the 2008-09 crisis governments reacted quickly to economic conditions (maybe as fast as 5 to 8 months), this is more of the exception than the norm. Indeed, budgets are done on an annual basis and changes during the fiscal year are more cumbersome. In fact, the evidence from VARs that use quarterly data show that in response to output shocks the response of government consumption is small and insignificant over the first quarters (in most cases it remains insignificant at any horizon). In addition, Corsetti et al (2010) also justify the use of annual data on the grounds that spending shocks might be foreseeable.
While we feel confident that the VAR using annual data provide useful insights into the effects of government consumption shocks, we later address the concerns with the use of annual data by building a database with quarterly data for a smaller number of countries, both advanced and emerging, and we repeat the panel VAR exercise on that sample.
Our specification measures fiscal policy as the logarithm of real government consumption (denoted by lrgovcons). The key variable of interest remains the current account-to-GDP ratio (cagdp). Output shocks are controlled for by including the log of real GDP (lrgdp) or the output gap (gap) in the VAR. This specification is similar to the one used by Monacelli and Perotti (2007) or Beetsma et al (2007) . We run panel VARs, removing individual country fixed effects through the Helmert transformation.
where is a vector of mutually uncorrelated innovations and the are coefficient matrices.
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We include three variables in our specification: . By including (log) real government consumption "first" we impose the assumption that government spending responds to the other variables with a delay of one year, while the other variables can react contemporaneously to changes in government consumption. The ordering of the other two variables is irrelevant to our results as we only analyze shocks to government consumption. We run this VAR for different subsamples and we also include in some of the cases the (log of the) real exchange rate.
Results are presented in the form of the dynamic impulse response of the three variables to an increase in the log of real government consumption equivalent to the sample standard deviation. In our description of the results we focus on the response of the current account. Impulse responses are within a band representing a 90 percent confidence interval estimated using Monte Carlo simulations (with 500 iterations).
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The empirical findings suggest that a fiscal expansion (proxied here by an increase in government consumption) generally leads to a worsening in the current account balance, though there are differences in the duration or the impact depending on the country sample. Figure 1 shows the response to a shock to the log of real government consumption by one standard deviation. The first panel includes all countries in the sample. The shock amounts to an 8% increase in government consumption. Given that the average ratio of the government consumption to GDP ratio in this sample is about 16%, this implies a change in this ratio of about 1.3 percentage points, if the level of GDP remained the same. In the impulse response we see that GDP increases on impact although it does so by a small amount (implying that our estimated multiplier is small).
14 Of course, if what we want is to understand how this change in government consumption affects the government balance we need to know how other components of the government budget are reacting to the shock (e.g. transfers or taxes). Given our focus on government consumption, we cannot measure these changes. However, the literature that has estimated VARs including taxes tend to estimate very small and insignificant responses of taxes to shocks to government spending.
15 Using this result we will refer to changes in the government consumption to GDP ratio as if they are equivalent to changes in the government balance to GDP ratio. Although this is just an approximation, it allows us to compare our results from this exercise with the ones presented in previous sections of the paper. 12 The coefficients matrix reflects contemporaneous relationships among the variables in . It is not possible to estimate and therefore identify the innovations without further assumptions. Therefore, we assume that is a lower triangular matrix. 13 For the estimation of our panel VAR we use the Stata programs of Love and Ziccino (2006) available on their web site. The estimation method is GMM and the error bands are generated using Monte Carlo simulations.
The effect on the current account upon impact is significant: during the year of the spending shock, for the full sample the results imply a deterioration in the current account by 0.35 percentage points of GDP. The response is similar for the next two years and then it fades away and gets closer to zero and insignificant by year 5. Although not reported, we have run the same regression just excluding oil exporters from the sample and the implied coefficient is smaller, at about 0.28 percentage point of GDP.
To compare with our previous results, if we normalize the shock to one that changes the government consumption-to-GDP ratio by 1%, we obtain a current account multiplier of about 0.3. This magnitude is similar to the results obtained in the panel regressions.
We also present in Appendix IV Figure 1 the results of running the same regression using only the emerging and low income countries (Panel B). Qualitatively the results are very similar except that the response of the current account is even more persistent and still significantly different from zero after year six. In terms of the size of the shock, we are looking at a similar change (about 9%). Given that the ratio of consumption to GDP in this sample is close to that of the full sample (about 15.3% of GDP), we are looking at a similar change in the government consumption to GDP ratio, of about 1.2-1.3 percentage points. The response of the current account is similar upon impact (0.35 percentage points) but it grows and reaches a level of 0.53 in the second and third years. If we translate these figures into a current account multiplier, we conclude that a 1 percentage point increase in the government consumption to GDP ratio worsens the current account by as much as 0.44 percentage points. 16 The fact that the effect on the current account is larger for emerging and low-income countries is also consistent with our previous results.
Panel C and D splits the sample according to how open the economy is in terms of trade. We establish a cutoff of 70% for the sum of exports and imports as a % of GDP. 17 We find that while the shocks to government consumption are similar in size. The response of the current account is larger for economies that are less open to trade. But the persistence of the response is stronger for more open economies. In addition, the precision of the estimates worsens and the standard errors are wider than before so statistically these differences are not significant.
Next we include an additional variable in our VAR: the log of the real exchange rate. Controlling for variations in the exchange rate can provide a more accurate picture of the response of the current account. Appendix IV Figure 2 provides the impulse responses for the 4 variable VAR both for the whole sample (Panel A) and for the sample of emerging and low income countries (Panel B). Introducing the real exchange rate does not significantly change the shape of the impulse responses. The current account still reacts negatively to a positive shock to government consumption in both the full sample and the sample of emerging and low income countries. The real exchange rate appreciates in response to the shock and the response is significant on impact. 16 If we exclude the oil exporters (not shown in the figure) , in response to a 1 percentage point of GDP increase in government consumption, the current account worsens by 0.20 percentage point of GDP during the year of the shock and 0.24 percentage point of GDP one year after the shock. The impact gradually peters out and becomes insignificant after four years for the sample that excludes the oil exporters. The somewhat stronger response in a sample consisting of emerging and low-income countries only, compared with the full sample, is consistent with the view that the import content of government consumption is higher, and the relative price channel more important, in emerging and developing countries than is the case for advanced economies. 17 The cutoff is calculated for the average over the whole sample.
After the second year the response becomes insignificant and the confidence bands widen significantly.
In terms of the magnitude of the response of the current account, overall we see a response which is in line with the one obtained in the previous exercise without the exchange rate. If we normalize the shock to a change in the government consumption to GDP of 1%, the current account responds contemporaneously by about 0.23 percentage points of GDP for both samples. In the case of emerging and low income countries the response increases to as much as 0.49 percentage points while in the case of advanced economies we see it reaching a maximum of about 0.37. From a statistical point of view the different between these estimates is not significant but it is interesting to see that after introducing the real exchange rate we obtain a result which remains consistent with the 3-variable panel VAR. From a theoretical point of view we could have expected that the introduction of the exchange rate had an impact on the estimated response of the current account but the results do not support this view.
The response of the real exchange rate is similar for both samples. If we consider a 1 percentage point shock to the government consumption to GDP ratio, the real exchange rate appreciates by about 3% on impact. Interestingly, this is very similar to the estimates of IMF (2008).
Panel Vector Auto-regressions (VARs) with quarterly data
We now turn to our results using quarterly data. The use of quarterly data allows us to be more certain about our identifying assumption that government consumption does not react to output within a period. We have collected quarterly data for many advanced and emerging economies (see Appendix V, panel B for the list of countries and years), about half as many as in the annual data sample. Despite the large coverage, we have a much smaller number of countries than in the annual data exercise, about half. Finding quarterly data for emerging countries is a challenge and in many cases the length of the time series is short. Nevertheless, the panel VAR results are highly informative.
We run a similar specification to the one we run for our annual data, initially with three variables (log of real government consumption, the current account to GDP balance and the output gap).
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The identifying assumption for the government consumption shock remains the same: both the current account and the output gap react contemporaneously to changes in government consumption but not the other one around. The difference, of course, is that we only need to assume that government consumption does not react to output within a quarter, as opposed to a year. Appendix IV Figure 3 presents the baseline specification for the full sample (Panel A) as well as the sample of emerging and low income countries (Panel B). Overall, we confirm the results using annual data. In response to a shock in government consumption, the current account worsens. From a quantitative point of view we have shocks that are smaller in size, because of the different frequency, but if we rescale the shocks to an implied change in the government consumption to GDP ratio of one percentage point, the response of the current account to GDP ratio is about 0.45 percentage points on impact and it goes up to 0.54. These multipliers are not far from what we obtained with annual data but slightly larger (for annual data we had 0.3).
For the sample of emerging and low income countries we find a very similar effect. The effect on the current account to GDP ratio of a change in one percentage point of the government consumption to GDP ratio is about 0.51 on impact and it reaches a maximum of 0.54. Therefore, as it happened with the annual data analysis, it seems that the impact on the current account for emerging markets and low income countries is larger than for advanced economies (although the difference is small and insignificant).
We also split the sample into countries with trade openness above the average and those below the average. This is presented in Panels C and D of Appendix IV Figure 1 . Overall, we get, once again, similar qualitative responses of the current account in both samples. However, and unlike in the case of annual data, here we can see a stronger response of the current account for countries that are more open. In particular, if we compute the government consumption multiplier on the current account, we obtain 0.3 for less open economies and above 0.5 for economies that are more open. Although one should notice that the results for less open economies are more precisely estimated and remain significantly different from zero for a longer number of years.
Finally, we look at the differences in response depending on the exchange rate arrangement. On theoretical grounds we expect that the response of the current account varies depending on whether a country has a fixed or a flexible exchange rate. In the traditional Mundell-Fleming model fiscal policy is more effective under fixed exchange rates because of the necessary accommodation of monetary policy. Under flexible exchange rates and under the extreme assumption that monetary policy does not accommodate the output effects of expansionary fiscal policy we have, following an increase in government spending, no effect on output because there is a one-to-one crowding out effect via net exports.
Exchange rate arrangements are not always stable so we need to look at episodes where there is some persistence in the regime chosen. Here we follow Ilzetzki et al (2009) and we use the same periods that they label as fixed and flexible. Of course, we have a large number of years where none of these labels apply. The reason for using their classification as opposed to the one we used earlier in the paper is that we can then easily compare the results to theirs and, in addition, it allows us to include a larger number of years in the sample.
We then run our panel VAR for each of the three samples (fixed, flexible and unclassified). We report in Appendix IV Figure 4 the response of the current account for each of the three samples. The size of the shock has been normalized to be equal to a 1% change in the ratio of government consumption to GDP. The standard errors are large for each of the three subsamples and the displayed responses are not statistically significant from each other. The estimates are similar and surprisingly we get a slightly larger response for the case of fixed exchange rate relative to flexible exchange rates. While this might be surprising we need to remind ourselves that the theoretical prediction that the response is larger under flexible exchange rates requires a certain behavior of monetary policy, for which we are not controlling. Ilzetzki et al (2007) find that the response is also similar across the two groups and the difference is statistically insignificant although their estimates show a slightly larger response of the current account in the case of flexible exchange rates. Interestingly, the response of the current account for the countries/years that have not been labeled as flexible or fixed exchange rates is as large or even larger on impact than for the other two groups.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed the relationship between fiscal policy and the current account. The paper's contribution comes from the breadth of its empirical investigation, in terms of both empirical techniques and country coverage. Our sample includes all advanced economies and most emerging and low-income economies, spanning, in most cases, the last three decades. The use of different specifications and econometric techniques allows us to check for the robustness of key results.
Across samples and specification we find consistently that a strengthening in the fiscal balance is associated with a current account improvement: specifically, a 1 percentage point of GDP fiscal tightening leads to a current account improvement of 0.3-0.5 percentage point of GDP. When we look at episodes of large current account adjustments we observe that the association between fiscal balances and the current account is weaker.
We also explore the role that different macroeconomic factors have in shaping this response. Overall, we find a stronger response in emerging and low-income countries, when the economies are more open, when output is above potential or initial debt levels are high. We also find that when using methods that are more robust to robust to endogeneity issues, such as panel VARs, the responsiveness is higher.
We explore the role of the exchange rate in the transmission of fiscal policy shocks to the current account. Overall we find mixed messages. The inclusion of the exchange rate in the VAR analysis does not seem to have a significant effect on the response of the current account. When it comes to the analysis of exchange rate regimes we also have mixed results. While in the panel analysis we find that the response of the current account is larger under flexible exchange rates, as one might expect, in the latter analysis using panel VAR techniques and quarterly data we find that the response of the current account is similar across all exchange rate regimes. Quarterly Data
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